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Mayer: Mayer: Use of Mediation in Employment Discrimination Cases

The Use of Mediation in
Employment Discrimination Cases
Matt A. Mayer*

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last thirty years, the number of individuals protected in some fashion
or another from discrimination has expanded to cover a large segment of the working
population.' When an employee is terminated, the reaction of some protected
individuals is to file a lawsuit claiming discrimination.' Because of the large number
of employment discrimination cases filed, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), the government agency entrusted with enforcing the various
anti-discrimination statutes,3 has turned to alternative forms of dispute resolution to
reduce its own backlog and the backlog of the court system generally.4 One method
the EEOC has utilized recently to reduce its backlog is mediation.5 Mediation itself
is not a bad alternative to resolving disputes; however, in the employment
discrimination setting, mediation poses both real and theoretical problems.
This Article will address the issues noted above. Part II discusses the realities
for employers and employees created by the increased filing of employment
discrimination claims. Part III encapsulates the procedural movement of a claim

* The author, Matt A. Mayer, is an associate with the law firm of Holme Roberts & Owen, L.L.P. in
Denver, Colorado. The author focuses his practice mostly in the area of employment and labor law. The
author graduated from The Ohio State University College of Law where he was the Editor in Chief of
the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution and where he received the ABA/BNA Excellence in Labor
and Employment Law Award.
The author would like to thank the staff at Holme Roberts & Owen and, in particular, Joan Jacobson
of the Holme Roberts & Owen Denver office, for their assistance in preparing this Article for
publication. This Article was initially prepared for a mediation seminar taught by Professor Nancy
Rogers at The Ohio State University College of Law.
1. See David C. Belt, Election of Remedies in Employment DiscriminationLaw: Doorway into the
Legal Hallof Mirrors,46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 145, 155 (1995).
2. After all, no one wants to admit that his termination was justified, so not only do antidiscrimination laws provide relief to those discriminated against, but such laws also allow individuals
to blame someone else for their termination. Just as there are employers that escape liability for
discriminatory conduct, so too are there employees who receive unjust compensation due to the nuisance
value of a discrimination charge.
3. The EEOC has jurisdiction of claims filed under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206d
(1994); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794a (1994); the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1994); and Titles I and V of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101- 12213 (1994). See The U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Laws Enforced by the EEOC (last modified Jan. 15, 1997) <
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws.html>.
4. These alternative forms of dispute resolution can include conciliation, arbitration, summary jury
trials, negotiation and, the topic of this Article, mediation.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994) (Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution) (authorizing agencies like
the EEOC to utilize alternative methods of dispute resolution).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

1

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1999, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Vol. 1999, No. 2
through the EEOC. Part IV summarizes the mediation process and notes why
mediation is one of the methods used to deal with these claims. Part V highlights the
pros and cons associated with the mediation of employment discrimination claims.
Part VI discusses the inherent tensions between the goals of mediation and the goals
of the anti-discrimination laws, as well as the inherent tensions that naturally flow
from added government regulation on our capitalist economic structure. Part VII
sets out alternative solutions other than mediation to deal with employment
discrimination cases. Finally, Part VIII concludes this Article by stating that
although mediation should not be used for employment discrimination cases, the fact
that it is, and will continue to be used, should be accepted by parties and practices
and should be adjusted accordingly.

II. THE DRASTIC INCREASE IN THE FILING OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
In many ways, the anti-discrimination laws6 are like Pandora's Box--once
Congress opened the lid of employment discrimination, there was essentially no
going back to the universal employment at-will doctrine. By creating causes of
action for real and perceived wrongful employment acts, Congress allowed
employees to flock in droves to the courts for vindication or for dejection, depending
on how you view the proliferation of discrimination cases. This occurrence was
certain to happen and is vividly demonstrated by the sheer volume of employment
discrimination cases filed over the last thirty years.'
The number of causes of action available to a terminated employee can include
the following litany of claims: (1) an unemployment insurance claim, (2) a
grievance claim, (3) an arbitration claim, (4-5) federal and state age discrimination
claims, (6-7) federal and state sex discrimination claims, (8-9) federal and state race
discrimination claims, (10-11) federal and state national origin discrimination claims,
(12-13) federal and state disabilities discrimination claims, (14) a union activity
discrimination claim, (15) a federal section 1981 claim, (16) an ERISA section 510
claim, (17-18) federal or state whistleblower claims, (19) a common law public
policy claim, (20) a libel claim, (21) a slander claim, (22) an intentional infliction of

6. For the entirety of this article, the phrase "anti-discrimination laws" encompasses the laws
established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990.
7. The myth of Pandora's Box involves the epic struggle between good and evil. According to the
myth, Zeus, the king of the gods, created Pandora for Epimetheus as a gift. Zeus also gave Pandora a
gift, the legendary box. When Zeus gave Pandora the box, he instructed her not to open the box because
it contained "hope." In time, Pandora's curiosity got the best of her and she opened the box, releasing
all the evils upon mankind. For opening the box, Pandora is led by Hades, god of the underworld,
throughout the world to see all the harm the evils had caused man. At the point when all hope seems
lost, "hope" itself escapes from the box and forces all the evils back into the box. See I ROBERT
GRAvEs, THE GREEK MYTHS 142 (The Folio Society 5th ed. 1998).
8. See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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emotional distress claim, (23) a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim,
(24) a tort claim and (25) a retaliation claim.9
In terms of cases filed, the federal courts have seen more than a 2,000 percent
increase in the number of employment discrimination cases, 0 as compared to only
a 125 percent increase in the general federal civil caseload." The EEOC reports that
it receives an average of 80,000 charges of discrimination per year.'2 This large
number of yearly filed claims creates a backlog at the EEOC of roughly 52,000
claims as of 1999." Congress has allocated additional resources in order to meet
these new claims. 4 Two important questions emerge: where do these claims come
from, and why has the number skyrocketed over the last thirty years?
The main reason, and the simplest reason, that accounts for the increase in
discrimination claims is due to the expanded coverage of protected individuals
beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 5 At both the federal and state level,6
legislatures have granted a variety of individuals protection from discrimination.
As a result, "over seventy percent of the total labor force is protected both by federal
employment discrimination law and by EEOC enforcement.' ', 7 In addition, the
United States Supreme Court has expanded the number of individuals protected by
anti-discrimination laws by interpreting Title VII to include sexual harassment,
reverse discrimination and disparate impact discrimination.'
Other reasons attributable for the increase in employment discrimination claims
filed have nothing to do with Congressional policy or judicial expansion of statutory
rights, but rather, have everything to do with pure numbers. First, there are more law
schools in 1997 than in 1964.'9 Because there are more law schools, there are more
lawyers practicing law.20 With so many lawyers saturating the market, it should be

9. See Peter M. Panken & Robert Webb, Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative Dispute
Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90's, in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION: ALIABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 585-86 (1991).
10. See Hon. Frank Evans & Shadow Sloan, Resolving Employment Disputes Through ADR
Processes,37 S. TEX. L. REV. 745, 747 (1996).
I1. See Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC Enforcement, 23 STETSON L.
REV. 53, 54 (1993).
12. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Charge Statistics FY 1992
through FY 1998 (last modified Mar. 18, 1999) <www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html>.
13. See Steven A. Holmes, EEOC gets back on road to respect, DENV. POST, May 4, 1999, at 20A.
14. See id.
15. See Belt, supra note 1, at 155.
16. See id. at 155-56.
17. Id. at 156.
18. See id. at 156-57; see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that
Title VII covered claims of sexual harassment); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976) (holding that Title VII covered claims of race discrimination committed against whites); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that Title VII included claims based on disparate impact
theory).
19. Currently, there are 182 American Bar Association accredited law schools in America. See
American Bar Association, Alphabetical List of ABA Approved Law Schools (visited Jan. 16, 2000)
<http://www.abanet.orgflegaled/alpha.html>. A large number of these law schools came into existence
after the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. For example, Ohio has nine law schools, five of which
pre-date 1960 and fourof which post-date 1960.
20. There are roughly 40,000 new attorneys graduating from law school every year. Ohio, which only
represents four percent of the United States population, is served by nine law schools and graduates
roughly 1,800 new attorneys per year. See Government Information Sharing Project, GeneralProfile
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no surprise to see an increase in employment discrimination claims,2 which the
United States has indeed seen.2 2 One lawyer noted that employment discrimination
law is "one of the most lucrative for many and an attraction for scores of
entrepreneurial lawyers. As many law school graduates cannot find work because
of diminishing job opportunities, a flood of new attorneys has entered into the
field."23 These new attorneys are most likely plaintiff's attorneys 24 because, while
it is easy to find a "wronged" employee to represent, it is difficult to find an
employer willing to employ a novice attorney without the experience and proven
reputation to defend an employment discrimination case. According to Fitzpatrick,
these plaintiffs attorneys are the individuals filing "shotgun complaints that plead
every imaginable claim that might somehow arise under a termination of
employment." 25
Second, one commentator observed that a large number of employment
discrimination claims filed "are at best unprovable ... and, not infrequently, lack
merit., 26 These unprovable or meritless cases undermine the legitimate claims
because the employer, its attorney and the EEOC representative become tired of
hearing claimants "cry wolf."27 The problem is that many plaintiff's attorneys file
baseless claims because they know the system and recognize the value of nuisance
as compared to the cost of employer vindication. 2 After all, an innocent employer
could incur upwards of $100,000 in attorney's fees and lots of bad publicity just to
be vindicated in a Motion for Summary Judgment; whereas, the employer could have
settled the case for $5,000 before incurring even $1,000 in attorney's fees or any bad
publicity. Hence, a smart plaintiffs attorney will file as many lawsuits as possible,
knowing full well that an adequate nuisance settlement will be reached in most of

for Ohio (visited Jan. 9, 2000) < http://govinfo.kerr.orst.edu/cgi-binbuildit?la-state.ohs> and U.S.
Census Bureau, U.S. POPClock Projection (visited Jan. 9, 2000) <http://www.census.gov/cgi
bin/popclock>. Because 40,000 old attorneys are not dying every year, the net result is that attorneys
are saturating the market. Hence, a buyer's market exists that allows law firms to be highly selective in
their hiring decisions. The new attorneys who could not get jobs due to poor grades or bad luck must
find work somehow-a good way to find work is to hang out a shingle as a plaintiffs attorney practicing
employment law.
2 1. Compare with John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984-85 (1991) (positing that as minorities and women
enter the workforce in greater numbers, discrimination litigation likely will increase).
22. See Brigid McMenamin, Un-naturaljustice,FORBES, May 5, 1997, at 122, 126.
23. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, The Future of Employment DiscriminationLaw as the United States of
America Enters the 21st Century, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE WORKPLACE ENTERS A NEW ERA:
ALI-ABA VIDEO LAW REVIEW STUDY MATERIALS 5, 15 (1994).
24. See McMenamin, supra note 22, at 128; supra note 20.
25. Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 15.
26. Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 532 (1987).
27. This concept undermines the court system's role in employment discrimination cases. The civil
rights movement felt that the courts offered the only real protection for discriminated minorities. Now,
partially due to the crying wolf effect, the courts and the EEOC have become less protective of
discrimination claims. This degeneration is evidenced by the high number of claims dismissed by the
EEOC and by the increased number of employers prevailing in a motion for summary judgment.
28. An illustration of this practice occurs when a plaintiffs attorney files a lawsuit and then settles
the case before the answer is even filed or discovery commenced. Although the settlement might be for
$5,000 or less, the plaintiffs attorney did little, if any, work and still collected his third of the settlement.
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those cases to sustain a nice livelihood. This reality, saddled with the procedural
hurdles set-up by the EEOC, render anti-discrimination laws coercive to employers.29
Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 includes a provision that allows for claims
for punitive damages under Title VII, which encourages employees, whether
wronged or not, and plaintiff's attorneys to file suit every time a termination occurs.

III. THE PROCEDURAL FLOW OF A CLAIM THROUGH
THE EEOC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Procedurally, a claim of discrimination filed with the EEOC goes through
certain steps. First, the claim is filed by filling out a form and submitting a statement
describing the alleged discriminatory conduct. 3
If a Charging Party has
documentation to support the allegation of discrimination, those documents are
submitted as well." An Intake Investigator then evaluates the claim and makes a
determination as to the likelihood of actual discrimination.32 If the Intake
Investigator believes that it is more likely than not that discrimination occurred, then
the claim is assigned "A" status;3" if the Intake Investigator believes that further
information is required before a determination can be made, then the claim is
assigned "B" status;' if the Intake Investigator believes that it is more likely than not
that no discrimination occurred, then the claim is assigned "C" status." Because the
status assignment is based solely on a Charging Party's statement, 36 which depends
largely on whether or not the Charging Party is able to articulate the alleged
discrimination, or say the magic words, in a manner that persuades the Intake
Investigator to assign an "A" or "B" status, this method of evaluation is problematic,
and certainly not in keeping with our justice system's reliance on the adversarial
process.
After a claim is assigned a status, several events occur. If the claim was given
a "C" status, it is dismissed by the EEOC and a Right to Sue Letter is issued to the
Charging Party indicating that the Charging Party may sue in Federal court.37 If the
claim was given an "A" status or a "B" status, the mediation option is offered to the

29. For example, when current Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas first became Chairman of the
EEOC, he noted that "the EEOC's enforcement methods have gone too far.... The process itself
becomes a punishment for employers. We'll drag you through endless discovery and bankrupt you if
you don't do what we want. I can't go for that kind of blackmail. Even the most discriminatory
employer has rights." See Prentice-HallInterview with EEOC Chairman ClarenceThomas: New EEOC
Chairman Sees Agency Management Reforms as Way to Improve Basic Civil Rights Enforcement,
COMPLIANCE REP. MANUAL BULL. No. 5 (EEOC, Washington, D.C.), 1982.
30. See Telephone Interview with Loretta Feller, ADR Coordinator for the EEOC (Apr. 23,1997) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Interview].
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Rarely will an employee obtain documents substantiating alleged discrimination.
37. See Interview, supra note 30. The Right to Sue Letter allows the claimant to file a lawsuit in the
courts without running into jurisdictional problems.
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Charging Party.38 If mediation is selected by the Charging Party and the EmployerRespondent agrees to mediate, then the EEOC sends the claim to an independent
mediator.39 Again, at this point in the process, the only information on record is the
statement by the Charging Party and any other information submitted by the
Charging Party. If mediation is rejected by the Charging Party, then the EEOC
begins its investigation of the claim.4
If settlement is reached in mediation and the settlement does not appear to
violate EEOC policy, then the claim is dismissed.4' If settlement is not reached in
mediation, the claim is returned to the EEOC for investigation. 42 After the EEOC
concludes its investigation, it either finds no reasonable cause for discrimination and
issues a Right to Sue Letter to the Charging Party or it sets the claim for conciliation,
which is a more intense form of mediation.43 If settlement is not reached at
conciliation," the EEOC finds reasonable cause for discrimination and either issues
a Right to Sue Letter to the Charging Party, thereby allowing the Charging Party to
file a lawsuit, or the EEOC files a lawsuit on behalf of the Charging Party.45

IV. WHY IS MEDIATION UTILIZED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS?
Mediation is an informal process of facilitation "through which two or more
disputing parties negotiate a voluntary settlement of their differences with the help
of a... mediator." The process of mediation involves several stages which include
"introduction of the process by the mediator[,]" "presentation of viewpoints by each
of the parties[,]" focusing of issues, "emotional expression by the parties[,]"
"caucusing to discuss confidential information[,]" "exploration of alternative
solutions" and entering into a settlement agreement.47
During the mediation, mediators will "work 'to establish their integrity,
competence and concern for the parties' and their positions."4 Mediators will try
to bring out the facts and issues "through the use of 'active' listening and open-

38. See R. Gaull Silberman & Paul Stevens Miller, Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Report to Chairman GilbertF. Casellas, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1, 8 (1995).
39. See Interview, supra note 30.
40. See id. Because it is outside the scope of this Article, the investigation process will not be
discussed.
41. See id. The EEOC will review any settlement to insure "consistency" with the relevant statute.
However, no one is sure what "consistent" means.

42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Conciliation, unlike mediation, occurs much later in the claim process. Hence, by the time
conciliation is ordered, the employer-respondent should have had plenty of time to conduct its own
investigation and make an internal determination as to the legitimacy of the discrimination claim.
45. See Interview, supra note 30.
46. NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW 1

(1987).
47. N ,NCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 8 (1989).

48. Mori Irvine, Mediation: Is it Appropriatefor Sexual HarassmentGrievances?, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 27, 31 (1993).
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ended questions... .9 This process helps the one disputant understand the position
and feelings of the other disputant. Although all mediators are different, most
mediators use caucuses to "discover additional information that the party did not
want to share in the joint session ...[and to] challenge the party's position and
5
attempt to persuade him or her to hear and understand the other side's viewpoint." 0
"Through a series of these joint and separate sessions, the mediator structures the
parties' negotiations, encourages cooperative bargaining, and helps them reach a
resolution that is satisfactory for all concerned."5
It is this author's position that mediation is utilized by the EEOC to reduce the
number of employment discrimination claims for three reasons: (1) each party to
mediation usually gets something out of it, (2) it pre-empts formal discovery and (3)
it is viewed as a win-win-win-win mechanism by employees, employers, the EEOC
and the judicial system. Pursuant to Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,52the
EEOC is authorized to use alternative dispute resolution, including mediation.
A. Something Is Better than Nothing
Whereas litigation is a "winner-take-all" endeavor, mediation provides each
party an opportunity "to achieve some benefit."53 The benefit to employers is found
in lower settlements where discrimination would be found were the case to go
beyond mediation; the benefit to employees is found in higher settlements where
discrimination would not be found were the case to go beyond mediation. Both
parties benefit in the early resolution of these disputes. In a juxtaposed position, the
burden on the employer is found in higher settlements where discrimination would
not be found were the case to go beyond mediation; the burden on the employee is
found in lower settlements where discrimination would be found were the case to go
beyond mediation.
The settlement rate for employment discrimination claims that are sent to
mediation is greater than fifty percent. However, of all claims filed *'ith the EEOC
where a finding is made, ninety-five percent55 are dismissed without a finding of
reasonable cause.56 Hence, the number of claims (reasonable cause claims) where
employees settle claims for less than what those claims are actually worth is small

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 32.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994) (Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution) (authorizing agencies
like
the EEOC toutilize
alternative methods of dispute resolution).
53. See Ann C. Hodges, DisputeResolution Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Report to
the Administrative Conference of the United States, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1007, 1052 (1996).
54. See Cindy Cole Ettingoff & Gregory Powell, Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Employment-Related Disputes, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1131, 1151 (1996).
55. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, All Statutes FY 1992-FY 1998 (last
modified Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html>.
56. See Oversight Hearingon the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:Before the Subcomm.
on Select Education and Labor of the House Comm. on Educationand Labor, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
n.6 (1994) (Testimony of Alfred W. Blumrosen, Thomas A. Cowan Professor of Law, Rutgers
University); EEOC's Performancein Handling Caseload Criticized by Witnesses at House Hearing,
1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 143 at D3 (July 28, 1993).
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when compared to the large number of claims (the ninety-five percent no reasonable
cause claims) where employers settle those claims for more than what that claim is
actually worth. 7
Mediation also gives mediating parties a high level of satisfaction. In one postmediation study, ninety-two percent of participants were satisfied with mediation and
"eighty percent said they would try mediation again."" These numbers, while
impressive, do not really say all that much because no one knows what results would
have transpired in a particular case had the case been litigated or settled later.5 9
Thus, without any type of baseline comparison, we do not know if the participants
who said they were satisfied would have been equally, more or less satisfied with
litigation. Presumably, satisfaction levels would be tied to the amount of money
awarded. One wonders if the high satisfaction rates are due to the juxtaposition
noted above--employees receiving more money than they should; employers paying
less money then they should.
B. The Pre-emptionof Discovery by Early Mediation
The mediation of employment discrimination cases under the EEOC will occur
prior to any meaningful discovery by either side. EEOC guidelines require
mediation within sixty days of the filing of the charge.' This early mediation
requirement will effectively prevent participants from accurately gauging the merits
of the claim because little or no formal discovery will have taken place within two
months of the EEOC claim. The only real information participants will have at the
mediation stage is the discrimination form filled-out by the Charging Party, as well
as the Charging Party's statement describing the discriminatory conduct and any
documentation submitted by the Charging Party.6' As a result, the danger always

57. One could argue that this scenario only plays out if defense attorneys fail to gauge accurately the
merits of various claims. However, because mediation occurs so early in the dispute process, defense
attorneys are unable to conduct a proper investigation to ascertain the merits of a given claim. See The
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Questions and Answers About Mediation (ast
modified Feb. 11, 1999) <http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/qanda.html>. This problem exists independent
of the circumvention of the formal discovery process due to early mediation intervention. Without both
a proper investigation and formal discovery, uninformed settlement decisions will be made more often
than not.
58. See R. Gaull Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Discrimination
Claims, 54 LA. L. REv. 1533, 1557 (1994).

59. This problem underlies the ability to measure the true satisfaction of mediation. Because neither
party really knows what would have happened had the case been litigated, mediation cannot validly
measure party satisfaction. This author submits that ifa plaintiffwas told at the conclusion of mediation
that a substantially similar claim was litigated with a much larger monetary award, then the plaintiff
would not be satisfied with mediation as parties seem to be now. This result is obvious. Thus, when
proponents of mediation wrap themselves around high satisfaction rates, they are really wrapping
themselves around a vacuum.
60. See R. Gaull Silberman, EEOCPilot Mediation Program,in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
LITIGATION: ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 997, 1008 (1993).

61. See Interview, supra note 30.
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exists that one party will use mediation in bad faith as a "means to do quick,
inexpensive discovery."62
This pre-emption of discovery hurts only the search for truth because (1) during
mediation, neither party has a duty to disclose any damaging information that would
otherwise be discoverable during formal discovery and (2) early mediation inhibits
realistic measurement of each party's side because, unlike formal discovery,
mediation does not permit "attorneys . . . [to] acquire a significant amount of
inadmissible information.... Therefore, their negotiations may not be governed by
a better sense of what actually happened ...."63 Pre-empting formal discovery
facilitates the settlement of claims based on little or no information and substitutes
the search for truth with the search for settlement.
Pre-empting discovery, however, does allow parties to "avoid the disclosure of
additional evidence that might impede settlement." ' As discussed below in Part VI,
mediation does not search for truth, rather mediation searches for satisfaction. 65 Our
refined, centuries old legal system is being displaced by a form of dispute resolution
where hiding information is viewed as proper conduct aimed at promoting
settlement, regardless of the truth.
This abandonment of the search for truth and justice was noted by Owen M.
Fiss, who stated that
[s]ettlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: consent is
often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority;
the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial
involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may
not be done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the
conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor
praised. 66
A similar thought was echoed by Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards who asked readers
to "[i]magine, for example, the impoverished nature of civil rights law that would
have resulted had all race discrimination
cases in the sixties and seventies been
67
mediated rather than adjudicated.,
In our rush for the quick resolution of employment discrimination cases and for
the reduction of backlogged court dockets, we are forgetting two of the principles
of our legal system--the overriding importance of the search for truth, and the
ascertainment of justice. As so eloquently noted by Chief Judge Edwards,
"'[i]f... reform benefits only judges, then it isn't worth pursuing. If it holds out

62. See Lois A. Baar & Michael A. Zody, Resolution Conferences Conducted by the Utah AntiDiscriminationDivision: The Elements of a Successful Administrative Mediation Program, 21 J.
CONTEMP. L. 21,39 (1995).
63. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2648 (1995).
64. Evans & Sloan, supra note 10, at 767.
65. See infra notes 109-24 and accompanying text.
66. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1075 (1984).
67. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV.
668,679 (1986).
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progress only for the legal profession, then it isn't worth pursuing.
It is worth
6
pursuing only if it helps to redeem the promise of America."' 1
C. If Everyone Wins, Does Anyone Lose?
When claims are handled via mediation and settlement is reached, the
assumption is that all parties come out winners. The employee wins because he
receives something--reinstatement, money or a good reference; the employer wins
because it presumably saves large amounts of money in litigation costs and
attorney's fees; the EEOC wins because it has one less case to investigate; and the
courts win because now one less case clogs the docket.69 Because both sides'
attorneys have invested little time or resources at such an early stage, both attorneys
walk away with a nice day's work worth of pay and room for yet another
employment discrimination case.
Of course, the loser in the big picture is the American legal system. The reasons
for this loss are discussed in full in Part V.B.

V. THE PROS AND CONS OF MEDIATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. The Pros of MediatingEmployment DiscriminationClaims
Proponents of mediating employment discrimination cases invariably cite
several benefits derived from such activity. These benefits include EEOC and court
cost savings, 70 quicker resolution of disputes,71 amicable dealings, 72 preservation of
relationships,73 reduction of backlogged dockets,74 greater control leading to higher
self-esteem and self-confidence,75 and nullifying entrenchment of positions before
it happens.76 Other benefits
include the "value of a compromise... [and] the value
77
of nonconfrontation. ,
Several of these benefits, however, have yet to undergo intense scrutiny or
intellectual debate in order to determine if such claimed benefits are derived from
mediating employment discrimination claims. Those benefits that have undergone
intense scrutiny or intellectual debate are revealed to be less beneficial than the
claims of mediation proponents.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 684.
See Silberman, supra note 60, at 1008.
See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 34 (1982).
See id.
See id. at 33.
See Silver, supra note 26, at 587.
See Ettingoff& Powell, supranote 54, at 1141.
See Silberman et al., supranote 58, at 1537.
See Hodges, supra note 53, at 1069.
Silver, supra note 26, at 528.
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In fact, an intense empirical study was conducted that measured the impact that
alternative dispute resolution schemes had on caseloads, costs and delays.7" The
conclusion of that study was that "ADR does not have any measurable impact on
caseloads and delays ...[and that] claims concerning ADR's potential to reduce
costs and delays are greatly exaggerated., 79 In comparing districts that used ADR
schemes to those districts that did not use ADR schemes, the study revealed that
ADR districts "are neither more efficient nor more effective in handling their
caseloads or inducing settlements."' The author reviewing that study posited that
"the time has long since come, not for expanded use of ADR as a court management
tool, but to question more seriously the premises underlying the ADR movement....
[T]he time has come for more exacting scrutiny of ADR in the federal courts to
determine whether ADR is the salvation of federal civil litigation--or if the emperor
has no clothes." '
As for the preservation of relationships, commentators have noted that
employment discrimination claims have shifted from failure to hire claims to
wrongful termination claims.8 2 In 1966, failure to hire claims outnumbered wrongful
termination claims by fifty percent, but by 1985, wrongful termination claims
outnumbered failure to hire claims by 300%. 3 This dramatic shift is attributed to the
success of the anti-discrimination laws. 4 Because wrongful termination claims are
easier to detect and to prove than failure to hire claims, "the probability of being
sued for [a wrongful termination] violation is roughly six times as great[,]" which
intuitively means that there should be (as there has been) an increase in wrongful
termination litigation. 5 Thus, the alleged benefit of preserving relationships via
mediation are either overstated or are increasingly not relevant because an employer
that terminates an employee has no use for the preservation of a relationship with the
terminated employee; rather, the employer's position will focus more on monetary
or good will settlements, not reinstatement.
Finally, a downside to the early use of mediation to prevent entrenchment is that
attorneys will not have had time to evaluate properly their cases in order to gauge the
strengths and weaknesses of their client's position. s6 Not only does this decrease the
attorneys' abilities to engage in settlement discussions, 7 but it also pushes the
attorneys dangerously close to committing malpractice under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. s8 It is one thing to enter into settlement and perform poorly
for one's client; it is quite another thing to enter into settlement when one does not
even know most of the facts pertaining to a particular matter. This ignorance is
especially true in the employment setting where decisions are highly fact-based.

78. See Kim Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the FederalCourts, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 889, 915 (1991).
79. Id. at 915-16.
80. Id. at 921.
81. Id.at 957.
82. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 21, at 1015.
83. See Belt, supranote 1, at 158 n.66.
84. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 21, at 1014-15.
85. Id. at 1017 n.107.
86. See Hodges, supranote 53, at 1069.
87. See id.
88. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1, 1.3 (1999).
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Hence, a good advocate should at a minimum conduct an internal investigation,
interview relevant witnesses, obtain affidavits from supporting witnesses, review the
hiring and termination practices of the employer, ascertain what the make-up is of
the employer's employees who fall under the relevant protected status and review
all employee records.
B. The Cons of Mediating Employment DiscriminationClaims
The opponents of mediating employment discrimination claims submit that the
benefits derived from mediation are more than offset by the burdens imposed by
mediation. The burdens of mediation, generally, include the deprivation of due
process, 9 the denial of the affirmation of public rights,90 the unequal bargaining
powers between employers and employees, 9' the pre-wired biases of the mediators
(i.e., won't settle if the claim is strong), 92 the danger of physical and psychological.
harm due to the volatile nature of the dispute, the undermining of the guarantee to
one's day in court (justice),93 the undermining of the discovery process94 and
prevention of public stigmatization of discriminating employers (i.e., the privacy of
mediation, unlike litigation, precludes the society from expressing its moral
outrage).95
The American legal system has undergone many refinements over its twohundred-plus year history. Those refinements include the adoption of rules of
procedure and evidence.' Such rules promote a legal system dedicated to the search
for truth and the attainment ofjustice. "The great procedural reforms of this century,
civil discovery and long-arm jurisdiction, were likewise intended to equalize power
and opportunity among litigants., 97 Mediation contains no such safeguards and
undermines the rules of procedure and evidence by discarding the discovery process,
a process vital to ascertaining the strengths and weaknesses of one's case, and by
circumventing the evidence rules. 9 As noted by one commentator, there are
mediation programs where "mediators will not encourage a settlement if an
unrepresented charging party has a strong case." 9 9 This blatant bias towards one
party indicates the procedural pitfalls of mediation--pitfalls not tolerated in our legal
system. In mediation, the search for satisfaction replaces the search for truth, so
anything becomes relevant, including a disgruntled employee's emotions,
psychological and physical failings, historical baggage and whatever else that

89. See Riskin, supra note 70, at 34-35 (discussing the cons of mediation, generally).
90. See Edwards, supra note 67, at 676.
91. See Silver, supra note 26, at 553.
92. See Baar & Zody, supra note 62, at 40.
93. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 23, at 13.
94. See Silver, supra note 26, at 544.
95. See John J. Donohue I1, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment DiscriminationLaw,
44 STAN. L. REv. 1583, 1605 (1992).
96. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1368-75 (1985).
97. Id. at 1401.
98. See id. at 1374.
99. Baar & Zody, supra note 62, at 40.
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employee feels is important." ° The trouble caused by this total "air-out" is
illustrated when an innocent employer is hauled into mediation (or court) due to an
employee's hurt feelings after the employee is terminated.
Removing employment discrimination claims from the court system prevents
the articulation of rules of law (norms) that society uses to ensure proper behavior.' 1
These rules of law also serve to "ensure the proper resolution and application of
public values,"'' 2 without which discrimination can be kept private ensuring that
discriminating employers will continue to conduct their business in immoral and
divisive ways without public censure or reproach.' 3 Courts are also becoming leery
of plaintiffs, given the increase in filing of nuisance-value cases. For many years, the
wronged plaintiff proclaimed: "I'll get my day in court!" This psychological
vindication provided Americans with the reassurance that we were all equal before
the law. As Chief Judge Edwards noted above, what would America look like today
if the seminal cases in our jurisprudence had been mediated?"°4
Lastly, mediation fails to balance the inequalities inherent in the employment
setting and, due to the personal and offensive nature of employment discrimination,
places parties in dangerous circumstances. Because mediation focuses more on the
satisfaction of parties and not on the rights of the parties, power imbalances are
preserved0 5 that make negotiating more favorable to the stronger party."° Several
commentators have argued, based on social science studies, that "when confronting
opponents of higher status or power, minorities would be well advised to opt for
formal adjudication and should not be forced by the courts [or the EEOC] into
informal proceedings."' 7 The main argument made on behalf of this position is that
[a]n imbalance of power can distort the settlement process in a number
of ways: (1) [tjhe poorer party will be less able than the wealthier party
to predict the outcome of litigation and thus will be in an inferior
bargaining position; (2) the poorer party may be in great need of damages
and thus willing to settle for a smaller sum rather than wait for a larger
recovery through litigation; and (3) the poorer party may be forced to
settle simply because she cannot afford to hire counsel or finance
litigation, regardless of the merit of her claim.'05
This power imbalance also causes problems when issues are highly volatile and
divisive. Under most circumstances, opposing parties in litigation have little, if any,
actual contact with each other, and when the parties do see each other, it is in a
courtroom under very formal settings. This separation reduces the potential for

100. See Riskin, supranote 70, at 34.
101. See Silver, supranote 26, at 525.
102. Edwards, supra note 67, at 676.
103. See Donohue, supra note 95, at 1605.
104. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the segregation of black and
white students can never achieve equality).
105. See Andrea Nelle, Making Mediation Mandatory: A ProposedFramework. 7 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 287, 294 (1992).
106. See Irvine, supranote 48, at 36.
107. Delgado et al., supra note 96, at 1359.
108. Id. at 1398.
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violence. In mediation, no such separation exists, increasing the likelihood of
violence, especially when one party feels overwhelmed or slighted.

VI. THE INHERENT TENSIONS CREATED BY USING MEDIATION IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. The Goals ofMediation Versus
the Goals of the Anti-DiscriminationLaws
The primary goal of the anti-discrimination laws is the elimination of
discrimination through EEOC and court action.'0 9 On the other hand, the primary
goal of mediation is the satisfaction of the parties." 0 The inherent tension created
as these two goals "battle" for primacy is vividly illustrated by the mediated
settlement of a claim in which the employer gets away with discrimination, but the
good reference letter gained by the employee satisfies him completely. Although
satisfaction is reached by the parties, discrimination has not been eliminated, rather,
it has been affined.
The opposite is true where the parties litigate a claim and the result is that the
employer is found "guilty" of discrimination, but the employee is highly unsatisfied
with the outcome because the discrimination was not found by the jury to be
egregious enough to award a large amount of money. Here, although satisfaction is
not reached by either party, discriminatory conduct has been found and the employer
will adjust its future conduct accordingly.
Mediation is a process "in which 'the emphasis is not on who is right or
wrong . . . but rather upon establishing a workable solution that meets the
participant's unique needs.""' . This alternative focus wreaks havoc in the
employment setting because innocent employers settle nuisance claims where no
discrimination occurred and "guilty" employers escape liability where discrimination
did occur. As noted above, suave plaintiffs' attorneys will manipulate the system by
filing EEOC charges and mediating without filing an actual lawsuit. Conversely,
wealthy employers may abuse mediation in order to avoid costly litigation and
maintain an unspoken policy of discrimination.
To the contrary, litigation facilitates the attainment of the anti-discrimination
laws' goal to eliminate discrimination from the employment setting. This facilitation
occurs because, unlike mediation, litigation does "set precedents, contribute[s] to the
development of clear, consistent legal standards to govern future conduct, [and]
reach[es] beyond the particular dispute to identify or eradicate class-based
discrimination."" 2 Likewise, the existence of litigation activates the attorney

109.
110.
111.
112.

See Silver, supra note 26, at 487.
Seeid. at 541.
Nelle, supranote 105, at 291.
Silberman et al., supra note 58, at 1557.
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reprimand measures, which reduce the likelihood of an overzealous plaintiffs'
attorney filing a baseless or frivolous lawsuit."'
Underlying the above tension is the inherent tension between the mediating
individual's ability to control his own case and the goal of the anti-discrimination
laws to root out pattern and practice discrimination. The informality of mediation
and its focus on a particular transaction reduces the EEOC's ability to "uncover
larger patterns of discrimination"' 4 and, thereby, undermines the goal of
discrimination elimination." 5 This assertion is supported by a study that found that
the EEOC failed to find pattern and practice discrimination where it existed because
mediation poorly served "the larger goals of civil rights programs by focusing
narrowly on the resolution of individual disputes."' 1 6 However, this country does
have an individualist bent that supports the idea that the individual should control his
own case, regardless of the goals of the anti-discrimination laws.
Related to this tension is the inherent tension between the goals of mediation
and the goals of the anti-discrimination laws, specifically in regard to the voluntary
settlement aspect of mediation versus the compliance with the law aspect of the antidiscrimination laws. In theory, parties mediate voluntarily" 7 and can draft
settlements without any adherence to the statutory purposes of the antidiscrimination laws."S Unlike court actions, these settlement agreements offer "no
assurance[s] that the legislative or agency-mandated standards have been
followed.,,19
In addition, "the dispute-resolution story trivializes the remedial dimensions of
lawsuits and mistakenly assumes judgment to be the end of the process."' 2 The fact
is that in many circumstances, the court supervises the employer's conduct to ensure
total compliance. Mediation simply does not have this protection because the
settlement reached is self-regulating. Only if one party fails to meet a requirement
of the settlement does the court potentially intervene--to clean up the mess after it
has been created when the legitimacy for court involvement is at its lowest.121

113. The reprimand measures include a Rule 11 motion, a Rule 37 motion, a 28 U.S.C. § 1927 motion
and a 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) motion. These measures are not available unless a complaint has been
filed. Hence, the only reprimand measure available is the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
grievance, which most attorneys refrain from using due to the tendency to regulate via the elimination
of, what this author calls, good faith conduct in future interactions. This phrase refers to the practice of
attorneys to treat opposing attorneys fairly and amicably due to the reality that both attorneys will likely
face each other again in the future. An attorney who fails to behave accordingly will find himself
opposite an attorney he mistreated in a previous encounter who will not be very cooperative should the
misbehaving attorney request an extension, a continuance or other measures where opposing party
cooperation is useful.
114. See Silver, supra note 26, at 524.
115. See Mark D. Klimek, Discrimination Claims Under Title VII: Where MandatoryArbitration
Goes Too Far,8 OHIO ST. 1. ON DISP. REsOL. 425, 435 (1993).
116. Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1055, 1060
(1996).
117. See Silberman, supra note 60, at 1008.
118. See Interview, supra note 30.
119. Edwards, supra note 67, at 678.
120. Fiss, supra note 66, at 1082.
121. See id.
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A final tension, intrinsically related to all three of those discussed above, is the
tension between mediation's search for satisfaction and anti-discrimination laws'
search for justice. Proponents of mediation invariably cite to the high satisfaction
rates elicited from participants in mediation"' and to the reduction in backlogged
dockets because of mediation--as if participant satisfaction rates and happy judges
Such
are the indices with which we measure the health of our legal system.'
minimalist thought obscures the point of the anti-discrimination laws--seeking justice
for the oppressed and disenfranchised.
As Owen Fiss noted, the job of the courts is
not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure peace,
but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative
texts such as the Constitution and statutes.... To be against settlement
is only to suggest that when parties settle, society gets less than what
appears, and for a price it does not know it is paying. Parties might settle
while leaving justice undone. The settlement of a school suit might
secure the peace, but not racial equality. Although the parties are
prepared to live under the terms they bargained for, and although such
peaceful coexistence may be a necessary precondition of justice, and
itself a state of affairs to be valued, it is not justice itself. To settle for
something means to accept less than some ideal.'24
It is this notion of justice that underscores the societal importance of our antidiscrimination laws, not participant satisfaction or judicial economy. Indeed, the
notion of justice guides us to implement our anti-discrimination laws through
litigation in order to achieve justice as the desired end. Mediation as a means fails
in this regard, which does not make it a bad tool for other areas of law, just a bad
tool for employment discrimination claims; the traditional court system, however
slow and purposeful it might be, seeks and secures justice as an end in itself.
B. The Inherent Tension Between Government Regulation
and a CapitalistEconomic System
An implicit theme of the anti-discrimination laws is the equalization of all
Americans in their private rights. Such a theme, albeit noble, conflicts with the
realities of a capitalist economic system. To ensure compliance, Congress has
created a body of anti-discrimination laws, and the EEOC has promulgated
mountains of regulations. A study by Arthur Andersen and Company revealed the
associated costs to private industry because of the various regulations.' 25 These
associated costs included $6.5 billion in compliance cost, 2 6 $1 billion in

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See Hodges, supra note 53, at 1057.
See Fiss, supra note 66, at 1086.
Id. at 1085-86.
See Donohue, supra note 95, at 1600.
See id.
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administrative and litigation costs,' 27 and $80 billion in productivity loss cost.
This assessment does not include the associated costs to private industry because of
state laws and regulations. A recent study indicated that state laws and regulations
increased labor costs by ten percent.2 9 One free market commentator noted that
such laws are "a new form of imperialism that threatens the political liberty and
intellectual freedom of us all."' 3°
One of the key critiques by the free market thinkers posits that some
discrimination is rational and, as such, should not be illegal.' This criticism falls
mainly on the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which
consumes "considerable resources for the purpose of defining and complying with
antidiscrimination laws that lack a compelling theoretical justification."'' Such laws
only serve to "disrupt useful business practices, generating transfers of wealth of
uncertain magnitude."'' 3 Mediation helps to minimize this disruption and further
acts of rational discrimination by allowing employers to settle employment
discrimination claims, which the employer felt made strong economic and
productive sense, before EEOC or court action. Such a result seems to subvert the
aims of the anti-discrimination laws. 134 Without mediation, employers, at a
minimumn, must deal with the investigative strong-arm of the EEOC pending agency
resolution, 35 and then typically face a court action and the added costs of litigation.
A similar tension is the confusion of public rights as compared to private rights.
The founding fathers, entirely cognizant of the mental and physical differences
among individuals, created our republican form of government in order to allow for
the maximization of private freedom, while insuring the security of political equality.
In the eyes of the free market, those with traits favored by a capitalist system should

127. See id. at 1601.
128. See id. at 1602.
129. See id.
130. RIcHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS 1,505 (1992).
131. See Donohue, supra note 95, at 1585.
132. Id. at 1586.
133. Id. at 1585.
134. A similar subversion of the anti-discrimination laws is found by the fact that an employer must
factor into any hiring decision the expected costs associated with hiring a protected individual because
a solid probability exists that if the individual is later fired, that individual will file a discrimination
claim with the EEOC. See Donohue & Siegelman, supranote 21, at 1024. Hence, employers will adjust
their behavior in order to avoid such future liability.
135. An example of this strong-arm is illustrated by the Hooters Restaurant claim filed by a group of
men. In December of 1994, the men filed a Title VII sex discrimination claim because Hooters, a chain
of restaurants with scantily-clad female servers as its trademark, refused to hire these men as servers.
The EEOC stepped in and tried to coerce Hooters into altering its practices. Hooters stood its ground
and launched a publicity offensive against the EEOC. See generally The U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, EEOC Comments on Hooters' Press Offensive (Nov. 21, 1995)
<http://www.eeoc.gov/press/l 1-21-95.html>. A similar incident occurred at the University of Chicago
Hospitals when a male systems analyst was terminated because he had a practice of luring women into
his office to view "raunchy Web sites." McMenamin, supranote 22, at 128. The terminated employee
filed a claim of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act because he had
multiple sclerosis. Id. Even though the EEOC conceded that the employer probably did not know about
the terminated employee's disability, it still "suggested" the hospital settle with the terminated employee
for $8,000. Id.
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be allowed to exercise their freedoms and prosper; conversely, in the eyes of the
government, traits are meaningless and all individuals should be treated equally.
As James Madison noted in The FederalistNo. 10, "Theoretic politicians, who
have patronized this species of Government (democracies, not republics), have
erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their
political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated
in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.' 36 Under this rubric, private
discrimination should not be made unlawful;"" rather, the law should "exclude all
instances of mere offense born of moral outrage or bruised sensibilities from the
class of actionable harms, however deeply felt the hurt."' 38
The basic premise in this line of thought is that employers who choose to
discriminate in the free market should be able to do so because either their decision
will be an economically sound decision (not hiring an older worker to perform
extreme physical labor) and that employer will prosper, or it will be an economically
unsound decision (not hiring blacks for purely prejudicial reasons even though a
large part of that employer's market is black) and that employer will not prosper.
It seems that Congress, by enacting the anti-discrimination laws, chose to ignore the
dichotomy between public rights and private rights. The EEOC's utilization of
mediation appears to reverse Congress' intent by allowing employers to discriminate
at a low cost as compared to the costs and outcome of an EEOC investigation or
court action. 1 39 Hence, discrimination becomes rational again and all individuals are
not treated equally in their private rights.

VII. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE USE OF MEDIATION
IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
The three main reasons cited for using mediation in resolving disputes are (1)
the speed of mediation,"4 (2) the cheapness of mediation 4' and (3) the reduction in
backlogged cases. 4 2 With these three goals in mind, I offer two alternatives to the
use of mediation in employment discrimination claims.
The first alternative is to create a universal just cause standard in employment
terminations and repeal the anti-discrimination laws. This alternative is not practical
for three reasons: (1) instead of reducing litigation, the point of focus will just
switch from discriminatory conduct to unjust firing, (2) most terminations are not
considered discriminatory, so we would be fixing a hole in the wall by building a

136. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

137. See Donohue, supranote 95, at 1589.
138. EPSTEIN, supra note 130, at 415.
139. This proposition, of course, assumes that plaintiff attorneys prefer settling more claims for less
money at an early stage before significant attorney's fees are incurred, than they do settling fewer claims
for more money much later after significant attorney's fees are incurred and the prospect of prevailing
decreases.
140. See Riskin, supra note 70, at 34.
141. See id.
142. See Ettingoff& Powell, supra note 54, at 1141.
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new house and (3) a just cause standard is inefficient as a market solution because
of the concept noted in (2). 143
The second alternative is to cut back on the anti-discrimination laws and create
greater sanctions for plaintiffs attorneys who bring baseless or frivolous claims.
This alternative works because it would allow for some types of rational
discrimination, it would free the market from some government regulation and it
would caution plaintiffs' attorneys from using the system for unethical practices.
In addition, this alternative would decrease the dockets of the EEOC and the court
system, which would in turn speed up the resolution of legitimate claims. One
commentator noted that "[i]t is not the least of the ironies of the study of Title VII
that it has brought in its wake more discrimination (and for less good purpose) than
would exist in any unregulated system."'"
Under this second alternative, anti-discrimination laws could be amended to
accurately reflect the types of discrimination that are abhorrent in modem society,
rather than discrimination that is rational or that is called discrimination because one
lobbying group exerted enough political pressure. Under current law, many people
feel that discrimination based on age should not be unlawful because there are
certain realities that accompany age and to legislatively deny those realities is the
equivalent of handcuffing employers in an intended free market system.
By amending anti-discrimination laws, we would reduce the amount of
government regulation, which would presumably free-up capital in the economy to
increase employment opportunities. The only apparent loser would be attorneys, but
holds out progress only for the
as Chief Judge Edwards commented: "If it [reform]
45
legal profession, then it isn't worth pursuing."'
Lastly, creating greater sanctions for plaintiff s attorneys who bring baseless or
frivolous claims would decrease the number of claims being brought under the antidiscrimination laws. Obviously, such sanctions should be carefully crafted so as not
to discourage legitimate claims from being filed; however, as noted in Part 11,146 the
saturation of the legal profession inevitably means that attorneys will file nuisance
claims simply because doing so sustains a "practice" and a livelihood. It is at this
conduct that we should aim attorney sanctions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The bottom line, in theory, is that mediation, based on the aforementioned
information, should not be used for the resolution of employment discrimination
claims. The American legal system is the only resolution mechanism that protects
both parties and ensures equality of position and equality of treatment.

143. See John P. Frantz, Market Ordering Versus Statutory Controlof Termination Decisions: A
Casefor the Inefficiency of Just Cause Dismissal Requirements, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 558
(1997).
144. EPSTEIN, supranote 130, at 497.
145. Edwards, supra note 67, at 684.
146. See supra notes 6-29 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

19

172

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1999, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2
[Vol. 1999, No. 2
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The bottom line, in practice, is that with so many employment discrimination
claims being filed and with Congress' current lack of political will, mediation will
be used to resolve employment discrimination claims. Because mediation will be
used for resolving employment discrimination claims, parties should take advantage
of mediation to achieve their respective goals.
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